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Abstract
Recent activity in spacecraft design has been geared toward providing an assortment
of new capabilities in space, in an attempt to satisfy the demanding mission requirements
posed by such programs as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and Space Station. These
requirements will include on-board fault detection and fault correction, and current work at
GE Astro-Space is addressing this area through the use of knowledge-based systems. This
paper describes a system which analyzes telemetry and evaluates hypotheses to explain
any anomalies which are observed. Results achieved from a sample set of failure cases are
presented, followed by a brief discussion of the benefits derived from this approach.
1. Introduction
The attitude control subsystem (ACS) orients and stabilizes the satellite after launch
vehicle seperation, maintains pointing during on-orbit and payload operations, and controls
the satellite attitude during orbit-adjust operations. Spacecraft attitude is of critical im-
portance, since a slight error in vehicle alignment not only degrades mission performance,
but also may cause changes in momentum rates that may propagate until the spacecraft is
spinning out of control. Current architectures provide some level of autonomy in the ACS
via closed-loop control, which can generally compensate for_attitude errors attributable
to normal vehicle dynamics. More serious errors are handled from the ground, during a
process which includes a rapid effort to put the satellite into a safe state (thirty minutes
to several hours), followed by an analysis phase which may take several weeks. During this
time, mission performance may be interrupted, a situation which is not compatible with
Government objectives.
To better maintain mission performance and to avoid propagation of attitude errors,
anomalous conditions must be detected and isolated as rapidly as possible. This goal
becomes harder to achieve as satellites become more complex; but if the satellite itself
were capable of performing fault-isolation, then the risk of serious failure would be greatly
reduced, along with the need for highly skilled ground personnel.
The ACS Diagnostic System demonstrates the potential of knowledge-based sys-
tems to offer this capability. As a preliminary step toward achieving satellite autonomy,
this diagnostic program performs ground-based detection and isolation of faults within
a satellite ACS. Detection of an anomaly triggers the generation of hypotheses. By ex-
tracting information from the telemetry useful to its diagnosis, this system independently
"pursues each possible explanation. The likelihood of each explanation depends on features
identified in the telemetry; additionally, explanations are ruled out when contradictory
evidence appears in the telemetry.
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2. Current Diagnostic Procedures
Present techniques for diagnosing ACS faults rely on attitude error limits for detection.
If the satellite attitude error limits are exceeded, the primary objective is to put the satellite
into a safe state, which may involve unloading the momentum in the wheels, performing
Auto Sun Acquisition, or disabling thrusters. Diagnosis proceeds only after the satellite
is in a safe configuration. The principal technique employed in locating the source of the
anomaly is to switch to a redundant component and then recheck the anomalous telemetry.
In the case of a Reaction Wheel anomaly, the suspect wheel is turned off and the telemetry
is monitored with the satellite operating on three wheels.
Effective application of these procedures requires some degree of expertise. For exam-
pie, the choice of which component to switch with its redundant partner relies in part on an
examination of certain informative telemetry behaviors. The diagnostic system, therefore,
requires expertise, so that it may apply knowledge of the ACS and of telemetry analysis
to explain a currently observed anomalous condition.
3. Expert Knowledge
To trouble-shoot anomalies, ACS analysts generally rely on their knowledge in the areas
of telemetry interpretation, failure mode behavior, and diagnostic strategies. Telemetry
interpretation knowledge is applied when the analyst extracts useful information from the
large volume of telemetry data. Examples of such information are transients and trends.
Failure mode knowledge may be encoded by capturing the expert's mental represen-
tation of a failure. Analysts often characterize an ACS failure in terms of the symptoms
(anomalies) which may appear during that failure, including_qualitative measures of the
support a particular symptom lends to a hypothesized failure. The expert might indicate,
for example, that during a tachometer failure there is a high probability that the wheel
speeds will oscillate.
Knowledge about diagnostic strategies defines the expert's own internal protocol for
diagnosing faults. It was determined through interviews with ACS analysts that the expert
initially reacts to an anomaly by considering all possible explanations, creating a mental
model for each hypothesis. The expert then seeks evidence which can distinguish among the
possible failures, primarily by comparing the actual telemetry to the predicted observations
for that failure. Important also is the expert's ability to rule out a failure on the basis of
evidence to the contrary. The expert may explain, for example, that the possibility of a
drive failure may be ruled out if the motion in the opposite wheel indicates that the wheels
are spinning normally.
4. Encoding Expertise
An appropriate representation must be selected for each of the three types of knowledge
discussed above. Telemetry interpretation knowledge consists of categorical descriptions
of anomalous behaviors, or features. This knowledge is encoded as rules, with each rule
capable of identifying whether a specific feature is present in a telemetry point's recent
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value history. The one-to-one correspondence between feature types and rules facilitates
knowledge engineering and rapid prototyping.
Failure mode knowledge characterizes ACS failures as the collection of symptoms which
may appear during that failure. A suitable representation for this type of expertise is a
schema, an object which is composed of slots that specify the attributes of the schema. One
schema completely defines a failure in terms of its symptoms, with each symptom described
in its own slot. This slot description identifies the name of the symptom, the maximum
time it would take for the symptom to appear during the failure, and the likelihood of
the symptom appearing during the failure. Likelihoods are expressed qualitatively with
the symbols 'H', 'M', and 'L' (High, Medium, and Low), 'A', and 'N'. An 'A' indicates
that the symptom must always appear, and 'N' that the symptom will never appear.
Figure I shows a sample failure schema. Because each symptom has attributes which
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Figure 1: A-sample failure definition.
are independent of any one failure, schemas are used for defining symptoms as well. In
this case the symptom is linked with failures by identifying each failure as a possible
cause of the symptom, where appropriate. This schema organization allows rapid access
to the predefined symptom and failure characteristics, and its modularity permits rapid
prototyping as well.
5. Encoding Diagnostic Strategy
The third type of expertise, diagnostic strategy, differs in that it is comprised of procedural
knowledge, whereas the two previous categories of expertise encompass declarative knowl-
edge. This leads to a different implementation: rather than employing rules or schemas,
this knowledge is represented as meta-rules which govern the way in which the declarative
knowledge is applied to the problem-solving task.
The objective of this meta-structure is to implement a reasoning strategy derived from
the techniques employed by human experts. The diagnostic knowledge discussed earlier is
suitably represented using the Set Covering Model [2]. Applying this approach, generating
hypotheses to explain a symptom is simply a matter of locating the symptom's schema
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and reading the possible causes for that symptom. Each such possible cause then becomes
a hypothesis. Hypothesis evaluation is accomplished by observing how well a hypothesis
covers the symptom-set, i.e. how many of its symptoms have been detected. Symptoms
vary in how strongly their presence supports a hypothesis, so this factor is incorporated
into the evaluation procedure. In addition, some symptoms are required to support a
hypothesis, and so that symptom's absence will allow the system to rule out the hypothesis.
Conversely, some symptoms provide contradictory evidence, so that a hypothesis may
be ruled out on the basis of that symptom's presence. This strategy is an appropriate
representation for the diagnostic expertise discussed above, but requires a mechanism for
handling the multiplicity of hypotheses. Fortunately, such a mechanism is available in this
system.
Hypothetical Reasoning
The use of hypothetical reasoning is of prime importance to the diagnostic capability
of this module. Using this approach, one hypothetical situation ('viewpoint') is created
for each possible failure. The viewpoints are distinct from eachother, so each operates
under its own set of assumptions (including of course the assumption about which failure
occurred). When evidence rules out a hypothesis, the associated viewpoint is eliminated.
Thus the use of hypothetical reasoning allows the system to pursue multiple hypotheses
simultaneously. The reasoning within each viewpoint is geared towards supporting the
hypothesis which generated that viewpoint, by setting goals to look for symptoms of the
corresponding failure, and so is called 'goal-directed reasoning'.
Goal-Directed Reasoning
Hypotheses are generated in a forward-reasoning fashion. This means that the detection
of a symptom triggers the hypothesizing mechanism, because the system has been 'told'
that if a symptom occurs then it should hypothesize all failures which could cause that
symptom. Once the hypotheses have been generated, however, the reasoning occurs in
reverse. In backward reasoning, the system is told, for example, that if Symptom-A occurs
then the likelihood of Failure-1 is increased. This generates a goal of detecting Symptom-
A. Suppose the symptom knows that if the reaction wheels are unbalanced then conclude
that Symptom-A has occurred. Then a subgoal is generated to detect an unbalanced wheel
pair.
Within each viewpoint, then, unique subgoals are generated. This is a very important
feature because of the computing expense involved in detecting symptoms. The savings is
realized by only looking for symptoms which will help to support or rule out hypotheses.
Savings also is achieved in the case when a hypothesis is ruled out, because all goals
generated to support that hypothesis are eliminated.
6. Implementation
Combining this reasoning strategy, the failure and symptom schemas, and the feature-
identification rules results in a system which emulates the diagnostic performance of a
human expert. The process operates first in a fault detection mode, and then if triggerred,
in a fault isolation mode.
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Fault Detection
The current practice of fault detection by limit-checking has an inherent limitation,
in that an anomaly may go undetected because no limits are exceeded. Moreover, even
when a telemetry value exceeds its limits, it may not do so immediately upon failure, but
instead may remain within limits for several minutes after the failure occurs. Further,
simulations of ACS failures indicate that transients are reliable fault indicators. The fault
detection mechanism used in this system, therefore, achieves the earliest possible fault
detection, by using any ACS transient to trigger activation of the diagnostic procedures.
This detection is the responsibility of the feature-identifying rule for transients, which
monitors the histories of ACS telemetry points. The detection of a transient triggers the
creation of viewpoints, each of which contains the assumption that one particular failure
has occurred.
Fault Isolation
The meta-rules responsible for viewpoint creation not only hypothesize failures, but also
scan each failure's list of symptoms, and set as goals the determination of these symptoms'
presence or absence. These goals are satisfied by the feature-identifying rules, each of
which is specific to a particular symptom type. A goal to find an oscillation in a wheel
drive, for example, would activate a rule which 'knows' how to identify oscillations. In this
way, only those symptoms relevant to the diagnosis are investigated.
The status of a symptom is initially UNKNOWN.Once it becomes a goal, it is assigned an
expiration time, by adding that symptom's maximum appearance time to the current time.
If it is observed prior to its expiration, it is assigned a status of KN0WN-PRESENT, otherwise
its status is KNOWN-ABSENT. This information is processed by probability determination
rules, which maintain a current probability for each hypothesized failure. The contribution
a symptom's presence makes to a failure's probability depends on the likelihood, expressed
qualitatively with the symbols 'H', 'M', and 'L', of that symptom occuring during the
failure. These values are stored as part of the symptom slots in the failure schema, and
are assigned numerical equivalents for computational purposes. If a symptom is known to
be absent, it contributes a corresponding negative likelihood. Unknown symptoms are not
included in the calculation. Probabilities are kept current by rules which react to a change
in a symptom's status, by adjusting the probability of any failure related to that symptom
(i.e. any failure identified as a possible cause in the symptom's schema).
The probability analysis helps the operator to distinguish among failures by providing
a basis for comparing the alternative hypotheses. But more powerful than that is the
system's capability to rule out failures on the basis of evidence in the telemetry. A failure
may be ruled out by the program under two conditions (the operator may also rule out a
failure). The first occurs when a symptom required to support the hypothesis is absent.
This is detected when a symptom identified in a failure schema as an 'A' symptom has a
status of KNOWN-ABSENT. The second condition occurs when a symptom which would not
appear during this failure is observed. This is indicated when a symptom identified in a
failure schema as an 'N' symptom has a status of KNOWN-PRESENT. When a failure is ruled
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out, all goals set to support that hypothesis are removed, and the reason for ruling out
the failure is recorded in its schema.
7. Test Environment
The diagnostic capability of this system was examined within a test environment which
provided simulated spacecraft telemetry and an interactive operator station. The telemetry
was derived from actual satellite telemetry (for 'normal' data) and from an ACS simulator
(for failure data). Telemetry processing software generates telemetry frames and sends one
frame to the diagnostic system every two seconds, to create a real-time environment. The
operator station keeps the operator fully informed about detected anomalies and about
the status of each failure being investigated. Three displays are available: a table of all
detected anomalies, a symptom display detailing a selected symptom, and a failure display
providing data about a selected failure.
8. Example
When the ACS Diagnostic System first detects a transient in ACS telemetry, the hy-
pothetical reasoning mechanism creates four possible explanations: a tachometer failure,
a sun sensor failure, a wheel drive failure, and an Attitude Control Electronics (ACE) fail-
ure. The goal-directed reasoning then sets as goals the detection of symptoms appearing
in each of these failures. As a result, the feature-identifiers are activated and telemetry
analysis begins. Figure 2 illustrates the result of the operator selecting a ruled-out failure
for display. A few moments later, the operator selects an observed anomaly, which brings
up the symptom display shown in Figure 3. After about f_ty seconds, a single failure
remains, but the system continues its analysis until the operator decides to accept the
failure. Figure 4 shows the main display after two and a half minutes, identifying the
relevant features found in the telemetry since the failure was first detected.
9. Conclusion
This prototype demonstrates the promise of the approach used because effective rea-
soning was achieved using a straightforward representation and relatively simple heuristics.
Further, because of the way the expertise is segmented, the system can not only be made
to perform better in this domain, but can also be applied to different problem areas.
Installing operational versions of an expert system such as this one thus becomes more
cost-effective, as new diagnostic systems can be generated from existing ones by replacing
a specific knowledge base and leaving the reasoning strategies intact.
Certainly, then, AI-based diagnosis will help to increase mission reliability and reduce
the need for highly-skilled personnel. As this technology evolves, advances in the intelli-
gence of these systems will provide even greater benefit. One way to improve knowledge-
based systems is through the use of learning. Expert systems can learn by modifying their
strategies when such strategies fail to provide acceptable solutions. This approach has been
tested in a satellite diagnosis system [1], and future work will provide large reductions in
the time and cost involved in knowledge engineering.
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Figure 4: Main Display Screen minutes into diagnostic.
Another area under investigation is the use of model-based reasoning. An expert system
could predict behavior using models of the satellite and its subsystems, and so could
identify faults by differences observed between actual behavior and behavior predicted by
the model. Isolation of faults is also facilitated by the causal links implicit in these models.
Applying models to diagnostic expert systems is currently under study at GE Astro-Space.
Results from this and other research promise to put more intelligence into AI, so that the
increasing complexity of space systems is paralleled by our improved ability to control and
maintain them, and eventually, by their ability to maintain themselves.
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